merlyn/collector/utils/url/index.js
Timothy Carambat cf3fbcbf0f
Improve URL handler for collector processes (#4504)
* Improve URL handler for collector processes

* dev build
2025-10-07 11:03:27 -07:00

104 lines
3.8 KiB
JavaScript

const RuntimeSettings = require("../runtimeSettings");
/** ATTN: SECURITY RESEARCHERS
* To Security researchers about to submit an SSRF report CVE - please don't.
* We are aware that the code below is does not defend against any of the thousands of ways
* you can map a hostname to another IP via tunneling, hosts editing, etc. The code below does not have intention of blocking this
* and is simply to prevent the user from accidentally putting in non-valid websites, which is all this protects
* since _all urls must be submitted by the user anyway_ and cannot be done with authentication and manager or admin roles.
* If an attacker has those roles then the system is already vulnerable and this is not a primary concern.
*
* We have gotten this report may times, marked them as duplicate or information and continue to get them. We communicate
* already that deployment (and security) of an instance is on the deployer and system admin deploying it. This would include
* isolation, firewalls, and the general security of the instance.
*/
const VALID_PROTOCOLS = ["https:", "http:"];
const INVALID_OCTETS = [192, 172, 10, 127];
const runtimeSettings = new RuntimeSettings();
/**
* If an ip address is passed in the user is attempting to collector some internal service running on internal/private IP.
* This is not a security feature and simply just prevents the user from accidentally entering invalid IP addresses.
* Can be bypassed via COLLECTOR_ALLOW_ANY_IP environment variable.
* @param {URL} param0
* @param {URL['hostname']} param0.hostname
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isInvalidIp({ hostname }) {
if (runtimeSettings.get("allowAnyIp")) {
if (!runtimeSettings.get("seenAnyIpWarning")) {
console.log(
"\x1b[33mURL IP local address restrictions have been disabled by administrator!\x1b[0m"
);
runtimeSettings.set("seenAnyIpWarning", true);
}
return false;
}
const IPRegex = new RegExp(
/^(([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])\.){3}([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9]{2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])$/gi
);
// Not an IP address at all - passthrough
if (!IPRegex.test(hostname)) return false;
const [octetOne, ..._rest] = hostname.split(".");
// If fails to validate to number - abort and return as invalid.
if (isNaN(Number(octetOne))) return true;
// Allow localhost loopback and 0.0.0.0 for scraping convenience
// for locally hosted services or websites
if (["127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0"].includes(hostname)) return false;
return INVALID_OCTETS.includes(Number(octetOne));
}
/**
* Validates a URL strictly
* - Checks the URL forms a valid URL
* - Checks the URL is at least HTTP(S)
* - Checks the URL is not an internal IP - can be bypassed via COLLECTOR_ALLOW_ANY_IP
* @param {string} url
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function validURL(url) {
try {
const destination = new URL(url);
if (!VALID_PROTOCOLS.includes(destination.protocol)) return false;
if (isInvalidIp(destination)) return false;
return true;
} catch {}
return false;
}
/**
* Modifies a URL to be valid:
* - Checks the URL is at least HTTP(S) so that protocol exists
* - Checks the URL forms a valid URL
* @param {string} url
* @returns {string}
*/
function validateURL(url) {
try {
let destination = url.trim().toLowerCase();
// If the URL has a protocol, just pass through
if (destination.includes("://")) {
destination = new URL(destination).toString();
} else {
// If the URL doesn't have a protocol, assume https://
destination = new URL(`https://${destination.trim()}`).toString();
}
// If the URL ends with a slash, remove it
return destination.endsWith("/") ? destination.slice(0, -1) : destination;
} catch {
if (typeof url !== "string") return "";
return url.trim();
}
}
module.exports = {
validURL,
validateURL,
};